Eeek okay... are you sure you don’t want to give a quick glance? Was worried I made it too personal perhaps
He didn’t respond...

David L. Cloe  
DHS Office of Policy for Latin America/Caribbean

O.K. – I think we can come up with some points if our embassy in Santo Domingo needs/wants to respond...

David L. Cloe  
DHS Office of Policy for Latin America/Caribbean

Dear David:

I wanted to share the blurb below with you from an editorial in a DR paper. I think we both saw this coming,

It was a pleasure working with you on the Kelly visit.

Cheers,

Kent
Here’s some suggested points for the small meeting with President Moïse. I think what we’re looking for here is more sensitive subjects tied to migration, some of which is mentioned in the memo, but perhaps not stressed.

- I appreciate the efforts of your government, as well as the previous, interim government, to support the repatriation process. Both U.S. Coast Guard and ICE officials tell me that cooperation has been outstanding, and I hope that cooperation continues in the future. To be clear, continued cooperation on this issue gives me/my government the breathing room to support your government’s request to extend TPS for another 6-12 months beyond the recently announced expiration date of January 22nd, 2018. And I know that extension is helpful to reaching your goal of developing and implementing a plan to welcome Haitians back to the island who can contribute to the economic growth and stability of your country.

- I know remittances from Haitians living and working abroad is approximately $2.5B a year, more than a quarter of your GDP. What programs and policies are you considering to better harness this inflow of funds to help strengthen the Haitian economy and create more opportunities for Haitians returning from abroad?

- When I’m finished with our meetings here, I will hold a brief meeting with UN Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) leadership at the airport before boarding my plane. I know the presence of UN peacekeepers in Haiti over the past decade has been controversial at times. As MINUSTAH transitions later this year to MINUJUSTH and a focus on developing the Haitian National Police (HNP), what goals do you have for the HNP during your administration? If you have specific goals and objectives, I can take those to my operational components (ICE, CBP, USCG, etc.) for consideration with my interagency (DoD, State, DoJ) partners as appropriate.

For the larger meeting, I would avoid the first bullet above, but the second and third are fine, and here are a couple of others:
The U.S. Coast Guard has worked closely with the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) to help build maritime law enforcement capacity and on broader maritime issues, such as search and rescue (SAR). I know that at least one of the two 32” Boston Whalers recently acquired by the HCG were damaged during Hurricane Matthew. Can you tell me about the HCG’s fleet of vessels, your goals for maritime law enforcement, and areas where DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard could support these efforts.

The cooperation between Haitian and Dominican Republic border security units is a step in the right direction to both expand legitimate trade and commerce on Hispaniola and strengthen efforts to target smugglers and other criminals in the border region. I was very impressed to hear about a joint trip, just last week, of Haitian and Dominican Republic border officials to El Paso to view how the U.S. interacts with Mexico on our common border. What are your long-term goals for cooperation with the Dominican Republic regarding your common border, and where do you think DHS can help with these efforts?

David L. Cloe
DHS Office of Policy for Latin America/Caribbean

From: Jones, Quinn
Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 12:58 PM
To: Cloe, David
Subject: Haitian President Meeting

David,

Materials for the meeting are attached below. Thanks again for the short turnaround on this!

Quinn
Lee este comunicacion en español

#SaveTPS

Alianza Americas Reacts to TPS Announcement

English Webinar at 2pm EST/1pm CST
Spanish Webinar at 6pm EST/5pm CST

Register Here (English)
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced yesterday that it will cancel Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 2,500 Nicaraguans. The agency has yet to make a firm decision TPS for Honduras, which places another 57,000 people in a cruel limbo and could potentially return them to dangerous conditions in their home country in as little as six months. TPS for more than 200,000 people from Haiti and El Salvador may be cancelled in the coming weeks.

Alianza Americas will coordinate an informational webinar TODAY, November 7 to discuss what this announcement means for our communities, our economy, and our region. Join this important conversation:

English: 2pm EST/1pm CST
Spanish: 6pm EST/5pm CST
Speakers include leaders from Alianza Americas, the Latin American Working Group (LAWG), Haitian Women of Miami (FANM), the New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), Make the Road New York and CARECEN DC, as well as TPS holders and their families.

Speakers

Oscar Chacon
Executive Director
Alianza Americas

Marleine Bastien
Executive Director
Fanm Ayisyen Nan
Miyami, Inc.
Haitian Woman for Miami

Lilia Alvarez
Director of Legal Services
CARECEN-DC

Anu Joshi
Director of Immigration Policy
New York State Immigration Fund

Daniella Burgi-Palomino
Senior Associate
Latin American Working Group
Additional Resources:

See these additional resources:

-  * Know your Rights (in Spanish only)
-  * Toolkit: #SaveTPS Resources for Advocacy & Community Engagement
-  * Statement: Alianza Americas Condemns DHS' Shameful Decision on TPS
-  * Statement: Alianza Americas Denounces Department of State Assessment on Temporary Protected Status
-  * Seeking Safety: Finding Violence, Detention, and Report: Deportation Along the Mesoamerican Migration Corridor (In Spanish - Click here)
This email was sent to (b)(6)

why did I get this?  unsubscribe from this list  update subscription preferences

Alianza Americas • 1638 S Blue Island Ave • Chicago, IL 60608 • USA

Sender: Alianza Americas <communications@alianzaamericas.org>; Alianza Americas <communications=alianzaamericas.org@mail52.at191.mcsv.net>
Recipient: (b)(6)
Sent Date: 2017/11/07 09:54:53
Delivered Date: 2017/11/07 09:55:13
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<th>Prophete, Ginette Y</th>
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<td>To:</td>
<td><em>St. John, Jillian</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject:</td>
<td>FW: FOR CLEARANCE: Points for Director Allen Greenberg and Charge Meeting with President Chief of Staff Laleau</td>
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<td>Priority:</td>
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From: Wahid, Linnisa J (Port-au-Prince) [mailto](b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2017 12:35 PM

To: Prophete, Ginette Y

Subject: RE: FOR CLEARANCE: Points for Director Allen Greenberg and Charge Meeting with President Chief of Staff Laleau

Hi Ginette,

Sorry one more point I forgot to add for your clearance

4. (SBU) **Criminal and Non-Criminal Flights**

**Official**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

From: Wahid, Linnisa J (Port-au-Prince)

Sent: Tuesday, November 7, 2017 12:30 PM

To: Prophete, Ginette (USCIS) [mailto]<b>(b)(6)</b>

Subject: FOR CLEARANCE: Points for Director Allen Greenberg and Charge Meeting with President Chief of Staff Laleau

Hi Ginette,
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<td>&quot;Cloe, David&quot;</td>
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&DHS-001-659-003276
Thanks Eric! Much appreciated!

Traci M. Batla
Latin America and Caribbean Affairs
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

From: Sigmon, Eric B
Sent: Friday, November 03, 2017 6:38:41 PM
To: Cloe, David; Batla, Traci; St. John, Jillian
Cc: Bowers, Allyson M
Subject: Wash Post: Central Americans and Haitians no longer need protected status, State Dept. says

Central Americans and Haitians no longer need protected status, State Dept. says
By Nick Miroff and Karen DeYoung November 3 at 5:58 PM


More than 300,000 Central Americans and Haitians living in the United States under a form of temporary permission no longer need to be shielded from deportation, the U.S. Department of State told Homeland Security officials this week, a few days ahead of a highly anticipated DHS announcement about whether to renew that protection.
On Tuesday, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sent a letter to acting DHS secretary Elaine Duke to inform her that conditions in Central America and Haiti that had been used to justify the protection no longer necessitated a reprieve for the migrants, some of whom have been allowed to live and work in the United States for 20 years under a program known as Temporary Protected Status (TPS).

Tillerson’s assessment, required by law, has not been made public, but its recommendations were confirmed by several administration officials familiar with its contents. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

DHS has until Monday to announce its plans for roughly 57,000 Hondurans and 2,500 Nicaraguans whose TPS protections will expire in early January. Although most arrived here illegally, they were exempted from deportation after Hurricane Mitch devastated Central America in 1998. Their TPS protections have been renewed routinely since then, in some cases following additional natural disasters and resulting insecurity.

Congress established TPS in 1990 to protect foreign nationals from being returned to their countries amid instability and precarious conditions caused by natural disasters or armed conflict.

Trump administration officials have repeatedly noted that the program was meant to be temporary — not a way for people to become long-term residents of the United States. Officials said that long-ago disasters should not be used to extend provisional immigration status when the initial justification for it no longer exists.

Tillerson’s assessment is consistent with broader administration efforts to reduce immigration to the United States and comply with legal restrictions that it maintains have been loosely enforced in the past.

“It is fair to say that this administration is interpreting the law, exactly as it is, which the previous one did not,” an administration official said.

The official acknowledged that the countries in question continue to suffer from problems of poverty, corruption and violence that, in many cases, have spurred illegal migration. But, the official said, those conditions should be addressed in other ways.

“The solution is going to require working with Congress and these countries,” the official said. “We are equally committed to finding that. There is no lack of empathy here.”

But “with this particular law,” the official said, “it is very clear to this administration what needs to be done.”

Administration officials have also said that the return of tens of thousands of migrants could benefit the Central American nations and Haiti, because their citizens will return with job skills, democratic values and personal savings acquired from living long-term in the United States.
Many of the immigrants have homes, businesses and U.S.-born children, but if the protections expire, they could be subject to arrest and deportation. “We understand this is a very difficult decision,” the administration official said.

DHS officials declined to say Friday what the agency planned to do, or when an announcement would be made.

“The acting secretary has made no decision on TPS,” said Tyler Houlton, a spokesman for the agency.

Tillerson’s letter does not amount to a recommendation. But DHS is required to seek the agency’s input, and officials said the State Department’s position carries significant weight.

The largest group of TPS recipients — about 200,000 — are from El Salvador, and DHS has until early January to announce its plans for them. At least 30,000 of them live in the Washington area, according to immigrant advocacy groups.

When the Obama administration last extended TPS for the Salvadorans, in July 2016, it said that they were eligible because conditions justifying it continued to be met.

“There continues to be a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in El Salvador resulting from a series of earthquakes in 2001,” Homeland Security officials said at the time, “and El Salvador remains unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return of its nationals.”

DHS must also decide what to do with about 50,000 Haitian TPS recipients by Thanksgiving Day. The Haitians, who are concentrated in South Florida, received TPS after the 2010 earthquake that killed 200,000.

Advocates say removing TPS would be a cruel blow to long-standing, law-abiding immigrants, forcing them to decide between remaining in the country illegally or leaving their homes and families. According to a recent study by the left-leaning Center for American Progress, TPS recipients have nearly 275,000 U.S.-born children.

If recipients lose their protections but defy orders to leave, it would not be difficult for immigration enforcement agents to find them. The provisional nature of their status requires them to maintain current records with DHS; the agency has their addresses, phone numbers and other personal information.

“Terminating TPS at this time would be inhumane and untenable,” a group of Catholic charity leaders wrote to Duke in a recent letter, arguing it would “needlessly add large numbers of Hondurans and Salvadorans to the undocumented population in the U.S., lead to family separation, and unnecessarily cause the Department of Homeland Security to expend resources on individuals who are already registered with our government and whose safe return is forestalled by dire humanitarian circumstances.”

If DHS ends the TPS protections, it is expected to grant recipients a grace period of at least six months or more to give them time to prepare for departure.
In May, then-DHS Secretary John F. Kelly extended TPS for Haitians for six months, far less than the 18-month waivers granted by the Obama administration.

Kelly, in a statement at the time, called the six-month window a “limited” extension whose purpose was to “allow Haitian TPS recipients living in the United States time to attain travel documents and make other necessary arrangements for their ultimate departure from the United States.”

Haiti is the Western Hemisphere’s poorest country and remains in the grips of a cholera epidemic triggered by United Nations troops who were sent after the earthquake.

Advocates of reduced immigration say the Haiti decision will be a key test of the administration’s willingness to follow through on its by-the-books rhetoric.

Immigration experts believe many of the Haitians could attempt to seek refuge in Canada, particularly French-speaking Quebec, to avoid arrest and deportation.
Thanks for sharing the concern, Ginette. We just had a call last week regarding DOS-DHS coordination on the rollout for the decisions on Central America, and DHS/OPA is working with State counterparts to ensure they have the opportunity (Post) to notify government counterparts prior to public announcement. We support doing the same with Haiti’s TPS decision and believe that should be worked into the comms plan once that is fleshed out in the weeks to come.

It appears from the below that Embassy PaP is concerned a decision on Haiti’s TPS may be announced contemporaneous with a decision on the Central American countries. The Secretary is reviewing the designations for the latter now, and will need to make a determination on Nicaragua’s and Honduras' designations by November 6. Haiti’s decision cut-off date is November 23. We have not received State’s assessment and rec for Haiti, and, internally, our Haiti-related decision material is lagging that of the material for the Central American TPS countries. Although we expect a decision soon on the Central Americans (or at least Nicaragua and Honduras, given the upcoming statutory deadline), we do not expect a decision on Haiti until later in November.

From: Cloe, David
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 4:12 PM
To: Nicholson, Maura J; Prophete, Ginette Y
Cc: Lassen, Brett H (Brett); Nicolas, Margarette B; Prelogar, Brandon B; Anderson, Kathryn E; St. John, Jillian; Batla, Traci
Subject: RE: Upcoming TPS Announcement

Adding two others from DHS PLCY as well...

David L. Cloe
Director, Latin America/Caribbean Affairs
DHS Office of Policy
From: Nicholson, Maura J
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 4:10 PM
To: Prophete, Ginette Y; Cloe, David; Lassen, Brett H (Brett); Nicolas, Margarette B; Anderson, Kathryn E
Cc: Lassen, Brett H (Brett); Nicolas, Margarette B
Subject: RE: Upcoming TPS Announcement

Ginette,

I’m looping in Brandon and Kathryn from USCIS OP&S for their awareness.

Brandon and Kathryn, I’m not sure what the comma rollout plan entails, but is a coordination call with post possible?

Maura

From: Prophete, Ginette Y
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 3:48:04 PM
To: Cloe, David; Nicholson, Maura J
Cc: Lassen, Brett H (Brett); Nicolas, Margarette B
Subject: Upcoming TPS Announcement

Good afternoon all,

The Front Office reached out to me as the Acting DHS Attaché, to discuss the upcoming TPS announcement. They indicated that they are aware that the announcement is imminent and would like to be notified immediately as soon as it is made. They are calling on DHS to keep them updated on any news regarding TPS. Bob Hannan, the Acting DCM stated that it is very important for Robin Diallo, the Charge D’Affaires to have first-hand information regarding the TPS announcement as she would like to be the one to share it with the President, Jovenel Moise. Bob Hannan explained that Robin Diallo is in a very delicate situation at this time. The next two days (Wednesday, November 1st and Thursday, November 2nd) are local holidays. She has been invited to join President Moise on a helicopter ride to the northern part of Haiti on Thursday November 2nd. Charge Diallo would not like for any news on TPS to leak to the president while they are spending the day together, as she would be put in a very awkward position; specially, if President Moise would find out about the announcement through the social media.

The Front Office requested to be informed as soon as DHS makes a TPS decision. As they related the sensitivity of the situation to me, I assured them that I would share their concern with the leadership at DHS. Please let me know if you can assist with this matter.

Your consideration is appreciated.
Regards,

Ginette Prophete  
Acting Field Office Director  
Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
American Embassy Port-au-Prince, Haiti

| Sender: Prelogar, Brandon B | Recipient:  
| Cloe, David |  
| Nicholson, Maura J |  
| Prophete, Ginette Y |  
| Lassen, Brett H (Brett) |  
| Nicolas, Margarette B |  
| Anderson, Kathryn E |  
| St. John, Jillian |  
| Batla, Traci |  

Sent Date: 2017/10/31 16:33:37  
Delivered Date: 2017/10/31 16:33:38
Absolutely; just add a little background and explain that Traci has already been sharing this information on the Central American countries...

David L. Cloe  
Director, Latin America/Caribbean Affairs  
DHS Office of Policy

From: St. John, Jillian  
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 4:53 PM  
To: Cloe, David  
Subject: FW: Chargé contact info?

Want me to pass to Quann?

From: Bowers, Allyson M  
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 4:36:56 PM  
To: St. John, Jillian  
Subject: RE: Chargé contact info?

Hi Jill,

Thanks for the call. Please find both Charge Diallo and A/DCM Bob Hannan’s contact information. You’ll notice I provided their personal emails as well. The embassy will be closed tomorrow and Thursday (11/1-11/2) for a local holiday, during which time the power will be out and the email server down. So they will not have access to their government email accounts.

Charge Robin Diallo

A/DCM Bob Hannan

State email:
Just as an FYI I do also plan to notify the embassy as soon as we receive word from you/DHS on the TPS determination. If you have any visibility on when DHS notifies the embassy I’d greatly appreciate the heads up.

Thanks!

Allyson Bowers | Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator | U.S. Department of State

From: St. John, Jillian [mailto:](mailto:b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2017 4:23 PM
To: Bowers, Allyson M
Subject: Chargé contact info?

Hi Allyson –
Per our conversation just now, our acting attaché noted the Embassy FO asked that week keep the Chargé in the loop re: TPS. Could you please pass along Chargé Diallo’s contact info so I can share with Nealon so he has it if needed?

Many thanks,
Jill

Jillian St. John | Deputy Director for the Caribbean and Southern Cone | Office of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs | Department of Homeland Security
Tel: (b)(6)
OHS Announcement on TPS Expected Soon

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is expected to soon make an announcement about the future of Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a program that has benefitted 350,000 people from Central America, Haiti, and other countries. TPS holders have had full permission to live and work in the US and are fully integrated members of local communities. But programs for Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are now at immediate risk of cancellation under the Trump Administration. Members of Alianza member organizations traveled to
Capitol Hill last week to call on Congress to #SaveTPS.

Alianza Americas will coordinate an informational webinar immediately following the pending DHS announcement to discuss what the decision means for our communities, our economy, and our region. Pre-register now to receive additional details and a link when the webinar is live. Webinars will be offered in English and Spanish.

Tackling Gender Violence Across the Americas

Neesa Medina, an internationally recognized women’s rights activist from Honduras, is partnering with Alianza Americas for an eight-day US tour to discuss how gender-based violence and impunity have driven thousands of women from Central America. Femicide has reached crisis levels in Northern Triangle countries, where a woman is killed every 16 hours. Join Medina at upcoming events in Chicago on November 1 (in English) and November 3 (in Spanish). Event proceeds will benefit Alianza America’s rapid response advocacy work for immigrants and families across the Americas. Donations at the Nov 3rd event will also benefit work to tackle domestic violence at Centro Romero.

Exploring Climate Change & Migration – and Calling for Support

On the heels of hurricanes and earthquakes that have ravaged the Americas, Alianza executive director Oscar Chacón discussed how climate change drives migration—and how the US immigration system is not equipped to support people displaced by natural disasters. Chacón recently delivered keynote remarks at the inaugural East Boston Climate Summit, and Alianza continues to support on-the-ground partners in rebuilding communities affected by disasters in Texas,
Mexico, Florida, Puerto Rico, and across the Caribbean.

**Building Our 2018 Agenda for Action**

Alianza has kicked off an ambitious effort to convene feedback meetings with our nearly 50 member organizations across the country. From now through December, Alianza’s national team will meet with stakeholders in regional “consultas” to evaluate the impact of our 2017 campaigns and collectively build an agenda for action in 2018. Join a meeting in your community and learn more about how to become an individual or organizational member of Alianza Americas.

---

**Like what you read?**

*Become an Alianza member, attend an event, and support our work.*
Something for everyone from the bilateral with Public Safety Minister Goodale.... Love getting this from our Canadian colleague first 😊

**From:** Natasha.Manji@international.gc.ca [mailto:Natasha.Manji@international.gc.ca]
**Sent:** Friday, October 20, 2017 12:12 PM
**To:** Meyers, Deborah
**Subject:** entre nous

Hi,

I got these bullets as first high-level takeaways, with a full report to follow once people are on planes with time to write.

- key topic: Irregular migration. Min again asked for advance notice of policy changes, including TPS. U.S. likely to bundle TPS announcements on Honduras, El S, Nic and Haiti. To be triggered by 60 advance notice requirement.

- STCA: RG said wants conversation with DHS on modifying. ED said happy to, knows DHS considering Cdn proposal, but have to square 3 internal POVs.

- PNR decision: agreed to work closely as Cda deals with fall-out of EU court decision. ED noted US will not negotiate a watered-down version with EU.

Let me know if you get anything on your end!

n.

---

<DHSC-001-659-003290>
Natasha Manji
Counsellor, Public Safety Canada | Conseiller, Sécurité publique Canada
Embassy of Canada | Ambassade du Canada

Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada

Sender: Meyers, Deborah

Recipient: Scardaville, Michael

Sent Date: 2017/10/20 12:23:38
Delivered Date: 2017/10/20 12:23:39
Good point...

David L. Cloe  
Director, Latin America/Caribbean Affairs  
DHS Office of Policy

I’m chalking it up to the guy having no real pull... We know the people who matter. ;).  

Best Regards,

Michael D. Huston  
Principal Director, Americas  
Office of Policy

How is that possible? I figured between the two of you, you knew everybody...

David L. Cloe  
Director, Latin America/Caribbean Affairs  
DHS Office of Policy
Edgar doesn’t know him either. He’s looking into it.

Best Regards,

Michael D. Huston
Principal Director, Americas
Office of Policy

---

Let me know if you want me to bug him for more...

David L. Cloe
Director, Latin America/Caribbean Affairs
DHS Office of Policy

---

He’s unknown to me (I think, anyway…. Don’t recall meeting him). Absent specific thoughts from Edgar I’d stick with general points:

- Mexico is a key partner for DHS.
- Edgar Ramirez is our primary POC in Mexico City
- DHS will be at the US-Mexico Security Coordination Group (Oct 17)—in the bodies of A/S Dougherty and ADEAC Koumans. Edgar can address specifics for the meeting if interested. DHS will also be at the 21st Century Border Executive Steering Committee (Nov 16-17)—Likely A/S Nealon.
• Looking forward to using these fora to get work done before Mexico moves into the presidential election cycle (election is in July, and the cycle starts in earnest in January/February).

v/r,

MDH

From: Batla, Traci
Sent: Friday, October 6, 2017 2:35 PM
To: OIA-MEX (b)(6)
Cc: Cloe, David (b)(6)
Subject: RE: MISPA Bilat Recommendations

Hi Mike,

The Mexico HOD for MISPA next week will be:

Javier Antonio Villalba, Advisor, National Security Council

Do you or your team have some toplines I can throw in DAS King’s book for him to have in his back pocket?

Thanks,

Traci

From: Batla, Traci
Sent: Monday, October 2, 2017 11:14 AM
To: OIA-MEX (b)(6)
Subject: RE: MISPA Bilat Recommendations

Mexico Colleagues,

Recognizing that we may not get the list of specific MISPA participants until late this week/over the weekend (in true OAS fashion), could I trouble you all with a few talking points with background – 1 page is fine – on what you’d want DAS King to raise with the Mexicans if we decide to do a bilat or if they flag him down in the hall/elevator/at coffee? If there are no specific TPs, maybe just a couple bullets on the top engagements/priorities coming up with the Mexicans?

Best,

Traci
All – just a friendly reminder to send any initial bilat recommendations by noon today. Thank you!

Good morning,

On October 10-12, DAS King will represent DHS at the Sixth Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas (MISPA) in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. We will be setting up a couple of bilateral engagements on the margins of the formal schedule and are looking for your recommendations. Most of the invited countries/organizations are Western Hemisphere, but there are some organizations that span multiple regions and thematic areas so opening this up to a broader distro. We should get more clarity next week on specific participants.

Please let me know your initial recommendations by noon tomorrow. Ideally, we’re looking for:

- Country/Organization
- Importance (critical vs. nice to have)
- Recommended Format (sit down vs. informal discussion during coffee break)
- General topics/objectives

We can then narrow down and scope out early next week. Thank you!

Best,

Traci

PARTICIPANTS:

OAS MEMBER STATES (http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp)
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia

<DHS-001-659-003295>
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
The Bahamas
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

INTER-AMERICAN REGIONAL OR SUBREGIONAL ENTITIES AND AGENCIES
Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)
The Pacific Alliance
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
Andean Community (CAN)
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Secretariat of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
Central American Integration System (SICA)
Regional Security System (RSS)
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
World Bank (WB)
United Nations International Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC)
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
World Health Organization (WHO)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)
Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB)
Conference of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Countries (COMJIB)

ORGANS AND ENTITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)
Inter-American Children’s Institute (IIN)
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
Inter-American Defense College (IADC)

POLICE COOPERATION AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP)
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
Commission of Police Chiefs and Directors of Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean
Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL)
Latin American and Caribbean Community of Police Intelligence
European Law Enforcement Agency (EUROPOL)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
Specific civil society organizations TBC

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<tr>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Coe, David</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td>Huston, Michael</td>
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<td>Sent Date</td>
<td>2017/10/06 17:31:08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivered Date</td>
<td>2017/10/06 17:31:09</td>
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Good morning – David/Traci

S1 Readbook – two articles – one regarding TPS for Haiti and a second ref drug production in Colombia

SC Readbook – two articles – one on Brazil and a second on Costa Rica – the Brazil articles deals with obstacles to cooperation.

Regards,

Steve

William S Justus
United States Southern Command Liaison
Department of Homeland Security

Sent Date: 2017/05/31 06:55:44
Nice job Davey!

Matthew H. King
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Office of International Engagement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
As promised...

David L. Cloe
DHS Office of Policy for Latin America/Caribbean

Duplicate
Negative Consequences of Ending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in El Salvador and Honduras for U.S. Interests in Promoting Prosperity, Security, and Governance in the Northern Triangle

NOTE: This document focuses on the negative implications of ending TPS in terms of its repercussions for Central America and undermining U.S. foreign policy interests and investments in that region. This is not to overlook the profound human, economic, and social costs to the United States of ending TPS for people who have deep roots in this country. These costs have been thoroughly documented, most recently in studies by Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) and Center for Migration Studies, and by researchers at the Center for Migratory Research at the University of Kansas, with the support of migrant organizations.

The United States has allocated more than $1.3 billion USD to the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America since it was approved in 2014. The current Trump Administration budget proposal would push that to $1.8 billion. The strategy describes three lines of work—Prosperity, Security, and Governance—aimed at moving toward "sustained, broad-based economic growth, better government performance, and improved security conditions" and "advance[ing] economic and social inclusion and safeguard[ing] citizen safety and security.” At the Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America in Miami this past June, Vice President Pence affirmed the U.S. government’s commitment to a "stronger, safer, and more prosperous Central America.”

Ending TPS for Hondurans and El Salvadorans would have profound negative impacts on these goals, undermining U.S. investments in improved security, prosperity, and governance in the region.

Section 1: Undermining Public Safety and Security

Deported TPS beneficiaries would be returning to an extremely unstable security situation in both El Salvador and Honduras. Their vulnerability may be higher than most deported migrants who have only been in the United States a short period of time, as they may have limited familial and social networks and knowledge of the country due to their long time away from El Salvador and Honduras. This would also imply a limited network to provide them with protection in precarious situations, forcing them to go underground into hiding, to enter the informal economy, or to flee the country again.

The two countries have held a grim competition for the title of world’s most dangerous country in terms of murder per capita in the last several years. Though official statistics of homicides at a national level for both El Salvador and Honduras decreased in 2016, homicides remain extremely high, particularly in the cities where TPS recipients are likely to return, and some other crimes are on the rise. The security situation for the average citizen remains extremely precarious. The World Economic Forum ranked El Salvador as the world’s third most dangerous country and Honduras as the world’s ninth most dangerous country in 2016. Levels of internal displacement are high in both countries, and internal displacement is often a precursor to migration. Returned
migrants would also be at high risk for extortion and being targeted for gang recruitment, thus potentially strengthening organized crime networks in the region.

1.1 Security Challenges in Honduras

Honduras’ homicide rate in 2016 is still dangerously high at 59 per 100,000.\(^2\) Rates are even higher in the two principal cities, to which many TPS recipients would likely return if deported: Tegucigalpa (86 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) and San Pedro Sula (112 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). San Pedro Sula, to which deported Hondurans are flown by the United States, was ranked the most dangerous city in the world in 2016.\(^3\)

Moreover, the levels of femicide (gender-motivated killings of women) have increased significantly in 2017 with 187 women murdered so far between January and June.\(^4\) In addition, during the first six months of 2017, the same numbers of LGBTI individuals have already been murdered as during all of 2016.\(^5\) Finally, there has been an increase in multiple homicides or massacres, the killing of three people or more in the same location and context, including of minors and children during the first six months of 2017.\(^6\) Levels of other crimes, including extortion, kidnapping, domestic abuse, and sexual violence, remain high and generate internal displacement.

Internal displacement is substantial and ongoing. According to the Honduran National Human Rights Commission, there was a 22% increase in the registered cases of forced internal displacement or risk of the same from January to May 2017 compared with the same time period in 2016.\(^7\) A 2015 study by the Inter-Institutional Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence, made up of government, UN Refugee Agency, and civil society representatives, found 174,000 people were internally displaced in the 20 municipalities they surveyed.\(^8\) While the Honduran government recognizes the existence of internal displacement, the legislature has failed to pass a draft law on internal displacement that has been in discussion for several years. Incipient efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs to relocate internally displaced persons at grave risk only cover small numbers of those in need.

Honduras’s human rights protection systems remain extremely weak. A human rights ministry announced by the government does not yet exist. A mechanism to protect human rights defenders and journalists covers less than a hundred people with minimal protection measures. Child protection services and programs to address domestic violence are inadequate and fail to protect women and children from domestic and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, or to provide critically needed services.\(^9\) And, perhaps most concerning is the low rate of effective investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Honduras, “impunity in Honduras is at a historical high and is a key factor contributing to violence and insecurity.”\(^10\)

While a police reform effort has resulted in a substantial purging of the police force, few of the police removed have been investigated and prosecuted. Honduras also continues to rely on Military Police, military soldiers with minimal police training who conduct sweeps and patrolling.
of neighborhoods but lack the training, to conduct investigations that are key to sustainably reducing crimes. These forces have committed a number of human rights violations. Operations by the Military Police in neighborhoods to target gang members often do not provide local community members with protection, may lead to reprisals and heightened gang recruitment once they leave, or can send gang members out to rural areas where there was not previously a presence.

1.2 Security Challenges in El Salvador

El Salvador’s homicide rate was ranked the highest in Latin America, with 81.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016. In El Salvador, the crimes of extortion, kidnapping, and rape continue unabated. Femicides decreased slightly from January to February 2017 but increased again in March of the same year.

The Salvadoran government has, on paper, a balanced security strategy in Plan Salvador Seguro. However, what is most evident is a "mano dura" state security strategy focused on cracking down on gangs that is accompanied by serious human rights abuses. According to the State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016, “As of October the attorney general was investigating 53 possible cases of extrajudicial killings. One took place in 2013, none in 2014, 11 in 2015, and 41 in 2016.” Cases of excessive use of force, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions by the police continue to be documented by the government’s Ombudsman Office on Human Rights (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos, PDDH), NGOs, and the media. According to one recent study, 51% of respondents considered the police to be corrupt in some way.

As in Honduras, NGOs that work with targeted communities say that police and military operations to rid communities of gang members can lead to reprisals against community members and increased recruitment when the security forces withdraw, and can push gang members to new areas where they had not been previously - contributing to levels of internal displacement.

Internal displacement in El Salvador is widespread though insufficiently documented. As the 2016 State Department Report on Human Rights Practices summed up, “According to the most recent poll conducted in December 2014 by IUDOP-UCA, 4.6 percent of surveyed citizens reported being internally displaced due to violence and the threat of violence and 8 percent reported having tried to migrate to another country for the same reasons. In 2015, the NGO International Rescue Committee estimated that the number of displaced individuals was approximately 324,000, or 5.2 percent of the country’s population.” In El Salvador, from January to July 2017, the Civil Society Working Group on Internal Displacement documented as examples 53 cases of violence and forced displacement affecting 256 individuals. The most common reasons behind the displacement were the murder of a relative, attempted murder, or rape. As in Honduras, the Salvadoran child protection system is rife with weaknesses and protections for women and children survivors of domestic and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence are practically non-existent. For crimes of this nature that do get reported, there is a 95% impunity rate.
The Salvadoran government does not recognize internal displacement and, as a result, there are no government services specifically for internally displaced persons. El Salvador’s small and dense population and the national reach of the gangs make it difficult to internally relocate persons at risk safely.

1.3 Returned migrants vulnerable to extortion, fuel organized crime and gangs

Extortion is a major problem in El Salvador and Honduras. Salvadorans and Hondurans pay an estimated $390 million and $200 million, respectively, in annual extortion fees to organized crime groups.\textsuperscript{18} Extortion is the “economic engine behind gangs and represents the largest share of gang income.”\textsuperscript{19} The amount of extortion money collected in Honduras is higher than the federal budget dedicated to security and to health.\textsuperscript{20} Nearly 80\% of registered small businesses in Honduras report having been extorted.\textsuperscript{21} According to the Honduran Chamber of Commerce, 72,000 jobs have been lost due to the collection of “war tax” or extortion, and at least 18,000 businesses have been closed.\textsuperscript{22}

Primary targets for extortion include taxi drivers, public transportation operators, small businesses, merchants, residents of poor neighborhoods, and individuals with family members in the United States. Deportation of TPS holders who have lived in the United States for longer than a decade would prove a boon to the extortion industry. This population is viewed as having resources – and community and gang members have observed family members of TPS holders in El Salvador and Honduras receiving the benefit of money to support education, housing, and other costs. These very same family members in El Salvador and Honduras have sometimes been targets of extortion themselves – based on the very fact of having a family member who lives in the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Some cases in the Central American Minor in-country refugee processing program (CAM) have involved Salvadoran youth threatened with harm, death, rape, or kidnapping unless their parent in the U.S. provided money to a gang.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to creating new extortion opportunities, deported TPS holders also provide a new source of potential recruits for gangs, given their vulnerability and lack of support network in Honduras and El Salvador. Addressing extortion and gangs are two U.S. priorities in the region, yet deporting the Honduran and Salvadoran TPS holding population works directly against these priorities.

Section 2: Threats to Prosperity in the Northern Triangle

Few would argue with Vice President Pence’s call at the June 2017 Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America, for “work[ing] together... to provide more people with a path out of poverty – to give the citizens of Central America a better path and a brighter future.” Now and for the foreseeable future, remittances will be both a de facto social safety net in the region and a significant source of income for the national treasuries of both Honduras and El Salvador.
2.1. Remittances as social safety net

In 2016, El Salvador received $4.58 billion in remittances, the largest amount ever, and especially startling when compared to a generously calculated total of $2.6 billion for all US formal economic activity, including foreign direct investment. Remittances, contributed by the estimated 2 million Salvadorans living in the United States, provided almost twice as much as total U.S. public and private sector investments combined in 2016. Honduras received more than $3.6 billion in remittances during the same period. Official statistics put this amount at more than 17% of total GDP for both countries.

Two recent studies by the Inter-American Development Bank described the role of remittances as a social safety net in El Salvador and Honduras. According to that research, one in every five people in El Salvador and one in six in Honduras receives remittances. Of those, about 70% are women in both countries. In El Salvador, 79% are low-income or poor households; that number rises to 83% in Honduras. About 90% in both countries reported using remittances to cover basic expenses on a monthly basis. If TPS ends, the negative consequences will be swift and severe for the economies of these countries and their families who depend on remittances.

2.2 Ending TPS would remove an important source of contributions to the tax base of El Salvador and Honduras.

The U.S. strategy for improving prosperity in Central America, as articulated in the State Department materials and reiterated by Vice President Pence in June, emphasizes the importance of tax collection as an engine for sustaining long-term improvements in security and governance. There is ample evidence that TPS holders are a significant source of Value Added Tax (VAT) revenues. A 2008 study conducted by the Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE) in El Salvador, the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (recently renamed Alianza Americas), and the Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) showed that remittances accounted for nearly 13% of total VAT collection in El Salvador. The sum contributed to VAT from remittances exceeded the total amount that El Salvador spent on anti-poverty programs that year by more than 600%.

Removing this important source of tax revenue could be extremely destabilizing to countries that are already struggling to produce enough tax revenues to cover security, governance and anti-poverty programs.

Section 3: Lack of capacity for Return/Reintegration Undermines Other Governance and Security Objectives

The U.S. State Department governance goals include improved systems for return/reintegration of returned (deported) migrants, judicial reform, transparency, and protection of human rights. All of these goals would be undermined by ending TPS. This section will focus on the negative impacts of overloading already fragile and inadequate systems for return and reintegration.
3.1 Overload systems for return/reintegration.

In addition to the inadequate conditions for safe return described in Section 1, return and reintegration services for migrants reflect the overall weakness of Salvadoran and Honduran governments to provide basic services to their citizens. Both El Salvador and Honduras have only incipient, small programs to receive deported migrants. These programs are currently unable to support the flow of deported migrants and are often limited to reception services next to airports in each country to receive deportees from the United States and centers along borders to receive deportees from Mexico. There are no comprehensive programs to support their reintegration into society and to ensure migrants do not fall prey to dangerous situations once again that may lead to increased internal displacement or remigration. A larger group of deported migrants, such as TPS beneficiaries, would overwhelm this system even more.

Neither country provides services that successfully facilitate access to education, employment, or healthcare for the majority of deported migrants. Case management models that follow up with deported migrants to ensure that they do not fall into precarious situations are run by a limited number of churches and NGOs, and are already overburdened. Lack of services, support, and follow up for deported migrants leaves the most vulnerable with no choice but to flee again.

3.2 Return and Reintegration Challenges in Honduras

Deported Hondurans go through the Honduran government’s official repatriation at Centers for the Care of the Returned Migrant (CAMR, acronym in Spanish), currently located at three different points in the country. Children and families deported by land go through the repatriation process at the El Belen repatriation center in San Pedro Sula while single adults go through the process in Omoa. Deportations by plane (presumably all those coming from the U.S.) would be processed at the La Lima airport center.

Government staff and the organizations that ensure that Honduran citizens are repatriated safely into the country are already at full capacity. An increase in deportations of Honduran citizens created by a loss of TPS would be unmanageable. The government has neither the physical capacity nor trained staff to accommodate the basic repatriation process that all migrants must go through upon return.

Beyond the approximately hour-long repatriation process, capacity to provide reintegration services to returned migrants is even scarcer.

Services for repatriated migrants by government entities and nonprofits are limited by location, age, and other qualifying criteria, which means that the vast majority of deported migrants have no support upon return to their country. Currently, nonprofits can support a small number of returned young people in San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and Olancho. These nonprofits provide psychosocial support, a key piece of successful reintegration, and vocational training for young people to have economic opportunities in their country. The Honduran government also has programs to provide services for deported migrants. However, those programs only have the capacity to serve a small number of the currently returned migrants, lack vital psychosocial and
individual accompaniment, and are not easily accessed by migrants. The local nonprofits building repatriation and reintegration models that can, alongside policy changes, make a lasting impact in the lives of young people who migrated would be unable to provide services and operate successfully if TPS holders were deported.

3.3 Return and Reintegration Challenges in El Salvador

Similar to Honduras, the Salvadoran government and nonprofits offer programs to deported Salvadorans that are limited in capacity and scope. The Salvadoran government has the Consejo Nacional para la Proteccción y Desarrollo de la Persona Migrante y su Familia (CONMIGRANTES) through its foreign ministry that is meant to provide access to reintegration services for returned Salvadoran migrants through Departmental Committees for Human Mobility. These committees were created in the departments of Usulután, Chalatenango, La Libertad, and Santa Ana in 2015.²⁹ Information about their outcomes and scale is not easily available. Government reports suggest that the current programs may reach only a tiny fraction of returned migrants. The Salvadoran government reports having provided training in construction work to some 14 returned migrants.³⁰ While these efforts to provide opportunities to migrants could serve as models, these government programs serve a very small percentage of the returned population and lack vital psychosocial support. Any increase in deportations though the loss of TPS would immediately overburden these fledgling governmental programs to serve migrants. In addition, a few nonprofits and churches also have programs to assist returned adult migrants, but their capacity is also very limited. An increase in deportations would make it impossible for governments and nonprofits to provide basic services.

3.4 Pressure on other fragile governance systems including anti-violence and human rights protections

According to Cristosal, a human rights organization in El Salvador that works with internally displaced individuals, “in our documentation of people internally displaced by violence and returned migrants with special protection needs, the overwhelming perception of the these vulnerable populations is that the state is unwilling or incapable of protecting victims of violence. 63% of our cases of internal displacement last year refused to denounce crimes they suffered, because they believe the Salvadoran authorities to be unable to respond and to be infiltrated by organized crime, or because they fear reprisals by their persecutors. This indicates a crisis of governance and rule of law in El Salvador, and this crisis would be significantly undermined by an influx of returned TPS holders that would overwhelm already collapsing state protection and reintegration capacity.”³¹

For more information, contact the authors:
Lisa Frydman, Kids in Need of Defense (KIND) - lfrydman@supportkind.org
Lisa Haugard, Latin America Working Group (LAWG) - lisah@lawg.org
Amy Shannon, Alianza Americas - ashannon@alianzaamericas.org
Alaide Vilchis-Ibarra, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) - Alaide.VilchisIbarra@elca.org


Red Lesbica Cattrachas, interview, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, July 24, 2017.


Gagne, "Insight Crime."


According to conversations with Casa Alianza and El Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente, a civil society organization in El Salvador focused on labor rights and migration, gangs frequently target for extortion individuals known to have family in the U.S. – as they are perceived to have resources.

Data from the Grupo de Monitoreo Independiente, civil society organization in El Salvador offering support to some youth with pending CAM cases.


Email exchange with Noah Bullock, executive director, Cristosal, August 4, 2017.
Kathryn - Anything you feel comfortable having me pass to a USCG colleague at this point? I can't believe any paperwork has been sent forward by you guys on this, but thought I would check...

David L. Cloe

DHS Office of Policy for Latin America/Caribbean

-----Original Message-----

From: Orsini, Louis

Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 11:59 AM

To: Cloe, David

Cc: Giska, Sara

Subject: FW: Final Version of Secretary Kerry's TPS Letter to Secretary Johnson
Good Morning David

Can you tell me if TPS for Haiti got extended?

Best Regards

Lou

-----Original Message-----

From: Snyderman, Eric [mailto:b(b)]
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2016 8:54 AM
To: Stodder, Seth; Giovagnoli, Mary; Pineiro, Marlen; KOUMANS, MARK
Cc: Cloe, David; Lenox, Mark R; Nicholson, Maura J; Rogal, Leah; Orsini, Louis; HANNA, RENE; NUNEZ-NETO, BLAS
Subject: FW: Final Version of Secretary Kerry's TPS Letter to Secretary Johnson

Seth, Mary, Marlen, Mark,

FYI in case you haven't seen it yet, State/PRM passed along this copy of Secretary Kerry's letter to Secretary Johnson recommending extension of Haiti's previous TPS designation (on E&T grounds) but recommending against redesignation tied to Hurricane Matthew.

Best regards,

Eric Snyderman
Morning DHS Gang,

Attached please find the final version of the letter that was signed by Secretary Kerry on TPS and transmitted to Secretary Johnson. Suspect you've seen this - but just in case.

Cheers,

Chris
Christopher C. Ashe

Deputy Director

Office of International Migration (PIM)

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)

United States Department of State

(b)(6)

Official

UNCLASSIFIED
Excellent, concur.

Michael T. Dougherty  
A/S for Border, Immigration and Trade Policy  
Office of Policy  
Department of Homeland Security

Good morning! Good flag to loop in Amb Nealon. Given that there are two briefings, one today for the outgoing DCM and one on August 31 for the Amb-Designate (not Senate confirmed), perhaps the latter briefing might be a good opportunity for his participation? Unless you advise differently, the plan today was to have USCIS provide just the facts about how the program works and if there are questions about the Department’s position, refer them to former Secretary Kelly’s statement on the matter: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/05/22/secretary-kellys-statement-limited-extension-haitis-designation-temporary-protected

Many thanks,  
Jill

Understand that State is hosting Haiti meetings with inbound diplo staff.
Might be a good idea to loop in Amb. Nealon so that he can become familiar with the new State diplo staff, and given that TPS is likely to come up, to represent FO views on that topic.

Best,

Michael T. Dougherty
A/S for Border, Immigration and Trade Policy
Office of Policy
Department of Homeland Security

Sent Date: 2017/08/14 09:54:30
| From: | Cloe, David |  
| To:  | Dougherty, Michael |  
| Subject: | Accepted: Haiti TPS Update |  
| Date: | 2017/05/12 18:56:39 |  
| Start Date: | 2017/05/15 10:00:00 |  
| End Date: | 2017/05/15 10:15:00 |  
| Priority: | Normal |  
| Type: | Schedule.Meeting.Resp.Pos |  
| Location: | MD's Office |  

| Sender: | Cloe, David |  
| Recipient: | Dougherty, Michael |  
| Sent Date: | 2017/05/12 18:56:37 |  
| Delivered Date: | 2017/05/12 18:56:39 |